In 2016 at a provincial conference of the South African Democratic Teachers Union, delegates erupted into a song that would define President Cyril Ramaphosa’s march to Luthuli House in 2017. The song called him to ‘phakama as the time had come for him to lead’. Symbolic to the call was made in Kwa-Zulu Natal by one of the most extensive formations within COSATU with a multiplier influence on graduating into voting citizens youth. It was a somewhat repudiation of Ramaphosa’s two rivals, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma and Zweli Mkhize, both of whom KZN was assumed to be a given. Ramaphosa’s fortunes were bolstered by his stance against graft and state capture, which were apex issues troubling the society the ANC claimed to be the leader of. 

By the time the 54th ANC National Elective Conference sat, Ramaphosa was riding high. He had consolidated the support of the trade union movement, many ANC branches, the business community, disgruntled veterans organised as 101 Veterans, the global investor complex, and the academic media complex. Branded as ‘the man Mandela wanted to succeed him, he was elevated to a prince of the global icon, with both Graca Machel, Winnie Mandela, and Archbishop Desmond Tutu giving him tacit endorsements. He became the leader South Africa needed after the adverse reporting which Jacob Zuma chronically attracted. Bolstered by a Peter Mokaba ANC generation of leaders, personified by the Paul Mashatile and David Mabuza complexes, Ramaphosa emerged victorious at the 54th Conference, albeit with a compromised margin, to be exact a 179 difference. Notwithstanding, the arrival of Cyril Ramaphosa increased brand South Africa’s value as an investment destination.

In theory, Cyril Ramaphosa ticked all the boxes South Africa and the investor community had expectations. He projected the ANC as an ethicalness construction site and himself as the ‘new’ that would rebuild and renew it as an organisation to operate at its best. He grew into a personality that rating agencies pegged their confidence on; in fact, there were times he was pitted against his organisation to determine who had the most support. The recall of Jacob Zuma defined him as a decisive President. The public pronouncements and the speed at which he removed ‘black’ executives at ESKOM in an apparent bid to decisively deal with the electricity crisis earned him further accolades. 

Faced with an unprecedented COVID pandemic, some argue impacted his reform cadence, he reacted to it in a textbook style. He followed the advice of clinicians, epidemiologists, and the disaster management community of South Africa and effectively put the country into a state of national disaster. This context introduced early into his Presidency a capability in a constitutional democracy to govern with proclamations and somewhat creating a space for Ramaphosa to be questioned less. The robustness his organisation was known for got choked by the government by proclamation occasioned by COVID19. Meetings were held virtually. The networking, lobbying and physical interaction prowess that shaped ANC debate traditions evaporated with the democratic traditions, which COVID19 also put on the burner. 

With investor confidence on his side, the ANC being wrapped as its president, positive ratings from Zuma’s adverse reporting tired voting population, and a capitalist economy with expectations that he knows what is at stake, Ramaphosa himself started to display not-so-Cyrilish outward confidence. With corruption and state capture being the new national grievance, Ramaphosa declared himself the political panacea; he organised his presidency to deal with it, including writing a public letter to ANC members and putting them at the centre of corruption. As approval ratings outside the ANC were shooting for the stars, discontent within was growing because his anti-corruption stance was in certain quarters interpreted as being anti-corruption by the ‘other faction’. With a split at the centre NEC, his half shared with the DD Mabuza and Mashatile bases, the democratic centralism proposition would have weakened his inception. He used a post-victory euphoria gap to make the most decisive calls on ESKOM and Independent Power Producer policies, whose implications might well be what will take him under in the next conference. 

The President became a managerialist with the NEC, and the established tradition of collective leadership became a casualty, an academic media complex manufactured cult of personality reminiscent of the one he has been operating within the various boards of his companies. As party insiders got rankled and somewhat confused by the rise of his personal power over that of the ANC, the bewilderment gap got flooded with policy missteps, reversal of black economic empowerment gains through litigation and less rebuttal by the National Executive, and ineptness in dealing with the shrinking state procurement led black economic empowerment opportunities. The concomitant rise in arrogance by apartheid status quo defending civil society movements that craftily use the profoundly liberal and civil rights protecting constitution has unfortunately boxed Ramaphosa into a collusion corner he did not take visible efforts to extricate himself, allow. 

While the encumbered black middle (of whatever) class has taken a correct posture to support his anti-graft stance in the immediate aftermath of a stressful Zuma negatively reported term, there are hush undertones of discontent at the inconsistencies of anti-graft enforcement agencies, especially given the race coincidences to it. These resentments dominate after tears discussions in townships, sermons in BantuBlack places of worship, professional association networking events, and WhatsApp groups organised according to influence and broader national packing order. The fact that there is yet no national movement to coordinate a message that there is disappointment at how President Ramaphosa has dealt with what was thought of a as no-brainers shouldn’t be read as silence in support of the policy missteps dominating how the country is governed from the centre. 

 Being interior to the workings of the governing party, how it works, how its decision processes are intertwined with its organisational makeup, the nature of the organisation is repugnant to a CEO or Executive Chair of the board style of leadership the President seems to be comfortable with. Chasing policy objects that make up the bulk of ‘shareholder value or meeting the interests of those that have invested the most in Ramaphosa’s presidency as an incorporated political enterprise within the ANC is what the President has the sharpest expertise to perform on. Those that stood against or are perceived as a threat to the attainment of such interests would, and generally not with the permission or consent of the CEO, be subjected to the wrath of consent manufacturing weapons that define them as a pariah to the stability of an established consensus of interests.  

At the upcoming 55th Conference of the ANC, Ramaphosa expects to be given a second-term ANC mandate to renew and rebuild the ANC. This is despite rolling electricity blackouts, collapsing public infrastructure, an economy in recession, hyperinflation, higher crime rates, non-functional branches of the ANC save for voting purposes, and collapsing SOEs. Indications are that the second term mandate will be renewed by an otherwise irritated by the incumbent’s leadership weaknesses because there seem to be few that can contest his outside ANC perception of Ramaphosa. Like the dangerous syrup that Coca-Cola is, as a brand, he is as polishable as coke is to be drunk at a conference of dieticians. On the other hand, his success, given his person-specific revelations about in-ANC campaign funding, PhalaPhala cash-in-the-furniture, the embarrassing non-payment of ANC staff salaries in his term, and hush toned and not yet in the public domain unproven other matters, will bring more of a captured and corrupt state than when new breeds of leaders are allowed to enter the fray. 

While society believes Ramaphosa will be emboldened by a second term to begin a genuine reform program, his track record with political power indicates that he might emerge as indecisive as he had been in his first term. The concentration of resentment, even within his traditional support base, the most vital political capital nodes in the ilk of Thabo Mbeki, and several outspoken businessmen and organised business formations, will grow stronger in his second term to levels where the only casualty will be the ANC itself. The in ANC factions require a stronger than Ramaphosa, and dare I say Magashule, leader to get them to tow any line, especially the reconstruction of South Africa from the rubble of the so-called post-nine years of corruption witch hunting. These render Cyril Ramaphosa weak, despite being difficult to replace as leader given what is on the horizon as alternative suitors to the throne. Maybe looking beyond those raising a hand to be President might unearth brighter talent befitting the requirements set by a post corruption witch hunt Presidential term. CUT!!!

🤷🏿‍♂️A ndzo vula hi mkhuhlwana wa la kaya, u lava mapoto bakithi