The consensus of a
liberated South Africa is under stress, and a new paradigm of freedom is taking
center stage. Societal interests are increasingly about the impact of public
policy on the quality of life that accrues. Generational expectations have
changed. New expressions of active diversities are reconfiguring the nature of
politics in RSA. The construct of national unity is taking over as the new
vocabulary of day-to-day politics. As a result, the threat of the GNU
collapsing generates new and engaging scenarios to consider and confront. 

The true implications of
the budget vote boycott and potential stalemate are that the state can only
spend 45% of the projected budget. This means it can only pay for the public
service and attend to emergency matters, some of which might still require
special appropriation votes. The government’s output and service delivery would
be structurally reduced and, by default, generate social discontent, an
ingredient of or for a rebellion waiting for leadership. 

In such contexts, the
GNU would need to be reconfigured if it fails to meet its executive
obligations, which include budgeting. The budget is a trigger obligation, and
if not fulfilled, it would assume a character reminiscent of a fragile ensemble
that could lurch a stable order into chaos. The political temperature in
Parliament and South Africa is one where the majority-wielding party does not enjoy sufficient confidence from all other parties to create a
governing threshold.

Establishing a coalition
that excludes the DA and parties in its liberal orbit would require a new
policy posture and paradigm. Suppose the deadlock persists with no
agreement on the fiscal framework; in that case, the prospect of dissolving the
government and calling for a new vote becomes a reality. Given the nation’s
state, this will trigger the question of national readiness to go into an
election mode. The consistent voter behaviour since 2016 has highlighted the
rise of smaller parties alongside a corresponding increase in state fragility
and a general decline in capability. 

This spawns several
scenarios and options the country would have to navigate for the continued
stability of the democratic order. 

 

Firstly, most parties
are unprepared to face a national election with their current internal
leadership, organisational deficits, and succession contestations. Save for a few,
most of their structures would, during such an election, function outside the
legal term of office because they are already due for branch and regional
conferences. At the central level of government, RSA national politics are effectively
on autopilot. All critical national sovereignty and security command
structures are skeletal in how they operate.

 

Secondly, the water,
electricity, and general decay of public infrastructure caused by gross
underperformance in local government do not bode well for governing parties and
coalitions. This condition creates a context where a national election will
deepen rather than resolve the crisis of a centre that holds. New permutations
with no political parties garnering more than 30% will generate
difficult-to-manage coalitions given the strange breed of leaders South Africa
seems to be attracting to its politics industry and sector.